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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The State charged David John Harper with trafficking in marijuana. Mr. Harper filed a
motion to suppress the statements and evidence obtained as a result of his traffic stop, on the
basis that I.C. § 49-638(1), the statute used to justify reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop,
was unconstitutionally vague as applied to his conduct. The district court denied the motion to
suppress. The matter proceeded to a jury trial, where the jury found Mr. Harper guilty. The
district court imposed a unified sentence of three years fixed. On appeal, Mr. Harper asserts the
district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
According to the district court’s findings of fact in its Memorandum, Decision, and Order
Upon Defendant’s Motion to Suppress, Corporal Chris Cottrell of the Idaho State Police
conducted a traffic stop on Mr. Harper’s car in Canyon County. (See R., p.68.) Mr. Harper’s car
had Oregon plates and was travelling eastbound on I-84. (R., p.68.) Corporal Cottrell stopped
Mr. Harper for following another vehicle too closely, about one-and-one-half car lengths at a
speed of about 65 miles per hour, in apparent violation of I.C. § 49-638(1). (See R., p.68.) Upon
approaching the passenger side of Mr. Harper’s car, the corporal smelled the “immediate and
strong” odor of marijuana. (R., p.69.) Corporal Cottrell noticed two large gift-wrapped boxes in
the back seat of the car, and decided to deploy his drug-detection dog. (R., p.69.) The dog
alerted to the odor of drugs on the outside of the car and on the boxes inside the car. (R., p.69.)
The corporal then searched the car and the boxes, and found freezer-style packages of suspected
marijuana inside the boxes. (See R., p.69.)
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The district court found Corporal Cottrell later arrested and booked Mr. Harper into the
Canyon County Jail. (R., p.69.) He also field tested the suspected marijuana and received a
presumptive positive result. (R., p.69.) Corporal Cottrell weighed the 31 individually-wrapped
packages, which had a total weight of approximately 17.38 pounds. (R., p.69.)
The State charged Mr. Harper by Information with trafficking in marijuana, felony,
I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(1). (R., pp.29-30.) Mr. Harper entered a not guilty plea. (R., pp.31-32.)
Mr. Harper subsequently filed a Motion to Suppress. (R., pp.33-34.) Mr. Harper asserted
there was a “[l]ack of reasonable suspicion for the stop,” and that he “was pulled over for
I.C. § 49-638 Following too Closely: Defense Counsel believes this statute is void for vagueness
and unconstitutional.” (R., p.33.) Thus, Mr. Harper asked “for all statements and evidence
obtained in this case as a result of this illegal stop to be suppressed.” (R., p.33.)
In his Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress, Mr. Harper moved “pursuant to
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and Article I, Section 17 of the
Idaho Constitution for an Order suppressing all statements and evidence obtained as a result of
an illegal search and seizure.” (R., pp.37-41.) Mr. Harper asserted I.C. § 49-638 is void for
vagueness as applied to his case, because the statutory terms had not been clearly defined so that
average individuals would understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. (R., p.38.) He
further asserted the statute’s wording lacked sufficient clarity, inviting arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement. (R., p.38.)
More specifically, Mr. Harper asserted Section 49-638(1) “does not give specific enough
guidance to inform a person as to when his conduct would be in violation of the law. He is left
to do the guesswork as to what would be illegal at any given point in time given the
circumstances of traffic.” (See R., pp.39-40.) The statute “does not give persons of ordinary
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intelligence adequate notice as [to] when they are following another vehicle too closely. The
standard is completely arbitrary and persons of ordinary intelligence from different traffic
conditions and driving standards would likely come to very different conclusions as to what
satisfied the statute.”

(R., p.40.)

Thus, Mr. Harper asserted Section 49-638(1) “is

unconstitutionally void for vagueness as written and as applied in this case.” (See R., p.41.)
The State filed a Brief in Support of Objection to Motion to Suppress Evidence.
(R., pp.42-47.) The district court set the motion to suppress for hearing. (R., pp.35-36, 48-49.)
At the motion to suppress hearing, Mr. Harper clarified he was asserting the statute is void for
vagueness, but also arguing “that there was lack of reasonable suspicion for the stop itself, that
he was not, in fact, following too closely.” (Tr. June 13, 2016, p.1, Ls.17-24.) Corporal Cottrell
then testified at the hearing. (See generally Tr. June 13, 2016, p.2, L.14 – p.27, L.17.)
In the following oral argument, Mr. Harper asserted Corporal Cottrell “could not be
specific enough with regard to either, (a), what the traffic was that day. He said it stuck out to
him. It’s too vague. And, (b), he could not say whether or not there was an actual standard that
took into account traffic conditions.” (Tr. June 13, 2016, p.28, Ls.14-20.) Mr. Harper further
asserted it was unknown how congested the road was at the time of the traffic stop, and without
knowing the level of congestion one could not be sure whether or not Mr. Harper was, in fact, in
violation of the statute. (See Tr. June 13, 2016, p.29, Ls.3-12.)
While Corporal Cottrell testified he had presumably been taught to follow three seconds
behind under certain conditions and four-and-a-half seconds under other conditions, Mr. Harper
asserted, “[i]t’s not codified in anything. It’s not written down for the reasonable person to look
at.” (See Tr. June 13, 2016, p.29, L.23 – p.30, L.2.) Mr. Harper asserted there was no way “for
anyone in this room to know for sure when they are following another vehicle too closely than is
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reasonable and prudent because, quite frankly, that is going [to] vary according to where you
are.” (Tr. June 13, 2016, p.30, Ls.2-7.) According to Mr. Harper, “if we simply can’t know
whether or not we’re in violation of the law, then the statute itself does not pass constitutional
muster . . . .” (Tr. June 13, 2016, p.30, Ls.15-17.) Mr. Harper also asked the district court to
review the video recording of the traffic stop. (See Tr. June 13, 2016, p.33, Ls.8-11.)
The district court subsequently issued its Memorandum, Decision, and Order upon
Defendant’s Motion to Suppress. (R., pp.68-76.) With respect to whether I.C. § 49-638(1) gives
notice to those who are subject to it, the district court determined “a reasonably intelligent person
could form an idea about what subsection (1) of the statute proscribes: do not ‘tailgate’ another
vehicle under any circumstance; if the weather makes it difficult for a driver to see, that driver
should follow another vehicle at a greater distance than it would if it were a dry, cloudy day; be
aware of traffic flow; etc.” (R., pp.70-73.) The district court also determined Mr. Harper “has
failed to show that he himself was void of adequate notice. The law allows a statute to hold a
driver criminally liable of a public welfare offense where the driver acted with ordinary
negligence. As a consequence, Harper is lawfully required to drive as a reasonably prudent
person and decipher whether he is following another vehicle too closely.” (R., p.73.)
Regarding whether I.C. § 49-638(1) contains guidelines and imposed sufficient discretion
on that who must enforce it, the district court determined the statute “does not vest complete
discretion in law enforcement officers.” (R., pp.73-74.) The district court noted “the Idaho
Driver’s Educational Manual recommends a minimum of three second[s] following distance, a
standard Officer Cottrell testified to being familiar with.” (R., p.74.) The district court also
stated Corporal Cottrell “testified that his training and experience shows the average person has a
reaction time of about 1 to 1.5 seconds, during which time the average driver will travel from
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between 95 and 140 feet if going 65 mph. These statistics may lawfully and effectively guide an
officer in determining whether one vehicle is following another too closely.” (R., p.74.) Thus,
the district court determined Section 49-638(1) “is not void for vagueness and it does not grant
law enforcement officers unbridled discretion.” (R., p.74.)
On whether there was reasonable suspicion to justify the traffic stop, the district court
determined “Officer Cottrell was reasonable in stopping Harper for following too closely.”
(R., pp.74-75.) The district court denied Mr. Harper’s motion to suppress. (R., p.76.)
The matter proceeded to a two-day jury trial. (See R., pp.84-101.) At the conclusion of
the trial, the jury found Mr. Harper guilty of trafficking in marijuana. (R., pp.100, 106.) The
district court imposed a unified sentence of three years fixed. (R., pp.133-34.)
Mr. Harper filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s Judgment and
Commitment. (R., pp.130-32; see R., pp.140-45 (Amended Notice of Appeal).)
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ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Harper’s motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Harper’s Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
Mr. Harper asserts the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress, because

I.C. § 49-638(1) is void for vagueness as applied to his conduct. Because Section 49-638(1), the
statute used to justify Mr. Harper’s traffic stop, is unconstitutionally vague as applied to his
conduct, there was no reasonable and articulable suspicion that his car was being driven contrary
to traffic laws. The traffic stop therefore violated Mr. Harper’s constitutional right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures.

The district court should have suppressed the

statements and evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop.

B.

Standard Of Review
As the Idaho Supreme Court has held, “[t]he standard of review of a district court’s

denial of a motion to suppress is two-fold. The appellate court will not overturn the trial court’s
factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. However, the application of constitutional
standards to the facts found by the district court is given free review.” State v. Wright, 134 Idaho
79, 81 (2000).
The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. State v.
Cobb, 132 Idaho 195, 197 (1998). A party challenging the constitutionality of a statute must
overcome a strong presumption of validity. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court in Cobb explained
that “an appellate court is obligated to seek an interpretation of a statute that upholds its
constitutionality,” and “[a] statute should not be held void for uncertainty if any practical
interpretation can be given in.” Id. (citation omitted).
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C.

Idaho Code § 49-638(1) Is Unconstitutionally Vague As Applied To Mr. Harper’s
Conduct
Mr. Harper asserts I.C. § 49-638(1) is unconstitutionally vague as applied to his conduct.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho
Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Idaho Const.
art. I, § 17. Evidence obtained in violation of this constitutional right is generally inadmissible
against the accused as the “fruit of the poisonous tree.” See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471, 487-88 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
A traffic stop by law enforcement constitutes a seizure of the vehicle’s occupants and
implicates the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. See
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 650 & n.1, 653 (1979). A traffic stop is akin to a limited
investigative detention and analyzed under the principles set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968).

See Rodriguez v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015).

Determining whether an investigative detention is reasonable involves a dual inquiry into
whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception and whether it was reasonably related in
scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place. See Terry, 392 U.S.
at 19-20.
An investigative detention is permissible if it is based upon specific articulable facts
which justify reasonable suspicion that the detained person is, has been, or is about to be engaged
in criminal activity. See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981); Terry, 392 U.S. at
21. Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer may stop a vehicle to investigate possible criminal
behavior if there is reasonable and articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being driven contrary
to traffic laws. See Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417; Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663.
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Here, Mr. Harper asserts there was no reasonable and articulable suspicion that his car
was being driven contrary to traffic laws, because I.C. § 49-638(1), the statute used to justify the
traffic stop, is unconstitutionally vague as applied to his conduct.1 Section 49-638(1) provides:
“The driver of a vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and
prudent, having due regard for the speed of the vehicle, the traffic upon and the condition of the
highway.” Whether Section 49-638(1) is unconstitutionally vague as applied appears to be a
question of first impression in Idaho.
The void for vagueness doctrine is rooted in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 457 (2001). This “doctrine requires that a
penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can
understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement.” Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held, “[a] statute may be challenged as unconstitutionally
vague on its face or as applied to a defendant’s conduct.” State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 712
(2003), abrogated on other grounds by Evans v. Michigan, 568 U.S. 313 (2013). The Korsen
Court explained that “[t]o succeed on an ‘as applied’ vagueness challenge, a complainant must
show that the statute, as applied to the defendant’s conduct, failed to provide fair notice that the
defendant’s conduct was proscribed or failed to provide sufficient guidelines such that the police
had unbridled discretion in determining whether to arrest him.” Id. According to the United
States Supreme Court in Kolender, “[t]he more important aspect of the vagueness doctrine ‘is not
actual notice, but the other principal element of the doctrine – the requirement that a legislature

1

But see, e.g., United States v. Hunter, 663 F.3d 1136 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding a similar Kansas
statute was not unconstitutionally vague as applied).
9

establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.’” Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358 (quoting
Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974)).

1.

Idaho Code § 49-638(1) Failed To Provide Fair Notice That Mr. Harper’s
Conduct Was Proscribed

Mr. Harper asserts I.C. § 49-638(1) failed to provide fair notice that his conduct was
proscribed. As Mr. Harper asserted before the district court, the statute “does not give specific
enough guidance to inform a person as to when his conduct would be in violation of the law. He
is left to do the guesswork as to what would be illegal at any given point in time given the
circumstances of traffic.” (See R., pp.39-40.)

Section 49-638(1) does not specify at what

distance following another vehicle becomes following “more closely than is reasonable and
prudent.” See I.C. § 49-638(1). Thus, the statute does not give adequate notice for when one is
following another vehicle too closely. (See R., p.40.) Put otherwise, “[p]ersons of ordinary
intelligence can only guess at the statute’s directive in this circumstance. Therefore, the statute
is unconstitutionally vague as applied . . . .” Cf. Burton v. State, Dep’t of Transp., 149 Idaho
746, 749 (Ct. App. 2010) (holding a statute governing the duty to signal when moving left or
right upon a highway was unconstitutionally vague as applied to circumstances where two lanes
merged into a single lane, with neither lane clearly ending or continuing).

The statute is

unconstitutionally vague as applied to Mr. Harper’s conduct.

2.

Idaho Code § 49-638(1) Failed To Provide Sufficient Guidelines, Such That The
Police Had Unbridled Discretion In Determining Whether To Seize Mr. Harper

Even if I.C. § 49-638(1) provided fair notice that his conduct was proscribed, Mr. Harper
asserts the statute failed to provide sufficient guidelines, such that the police had unbridled
discretion in determining whether to seize him. As discussed above, the United States Supreme
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Court has held the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law
enforcement is the more important part of the vagueness doctrine. See Kolender, 461 U.S.
at 358. The Kolender Court warned that “[w]here the legislature fails to provide such minimal
guidelines, a criminal statute may permit a ‘standardless sweep that allows policemen,
prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilections.’” Id. (quoting Smith, 415 U.S. at
575). However, “[l]egislatures may not so abdicate their responsibilities for setting the standards
of the criminal law.” Smith, 415 U.S. at 575. Rather, the “absence of any ascertainable standard
for inclusion or exclusion is precisely what offends the Due Process Clause.” Id. at 578 (citation
omitted). Simply put, a law is void for vagueness when it subjects a person “to criminal liability
under a standard so indefinite that police, court, and jury [are] free to react to nothing more than
their own preferences . . . .” Id.
Idaho Code § 49-638(1) provides no guidelines for law enforcement officers to determine
when a person is following another person “more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having
due regard for the speed of the vehicle, the traffic upon and the condition of the highway.”
See I.C. § 49-638(1).

As Mr. Harper asserted before the district court, “[t]he standard is

completely arbitrary and persons of ordinary intelligence from different traffic conditions and
driving standards would likely come to very different conclusions as what satisfied the statute.”
(See R., p.40.) The statute therefore “vests complete discretion in individual police officers.”
See State v. Bitt, 118 Idaho 586, 589 (1990).
A comparison of I.C. § 49-638(1) with the ordinance in Bitt is instructive. In Bitt, the
loitering ordinance at issue provided that, generally, “a peace officer shall prior to any arrest for
an offense under this section afford the actor an opportunity to dispel any alarm which would
otherwise be warranted by requesting him to identify himself and explain his presence and
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conduct.” Bitt, 118 Idaho at 588. Reviewing the ordinance for vagueness, the Idaho Supreme
Court held it was similar to the unconstitutionally-vague statute struck down in Kolender, in that
the “ordinance vests complete discretion in individual police officers.” Id. at 589. By providing
“that a person cannot be arrested or convicted unless he fails to identify himself and offer an
explanation of his presence and conduct which dispels the police officer’s alarm,” the ordinance
“vests complete discretion in the hands of the police officer to determine whether the person has
provided a credible and reliable explanation.” Id. at 590. The Bitt Court therefore held the
ordinance “creates the potential for arbitrary and discriminatory arrests condemned in Kolender,
and condemned by our State Constitution.” Id.
Similarly, I.C. § 49-638(1) provides a person may not follow another vehicle “more
closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of the vehicle, the traffic
upon and the condition of the highway.” Thus, Section 49-638(1) vests complete discretion in
the hands of the police officer to determine whether a person followed more closely than is
reasonable and prudent. See Bitt, 118 Idaho at 590. Just as officers under the ordinance in Bitt
had full discretion to determine whether a person provided a credible and reliable explanation,
see id. at 589-90, under the statute here, officers would have full discretion to determine whether
a person had due regard for the speed of the vehicle, traffic, and the condition of the highway.
Like the ordinance in Bitt, Section 49-638(1) “creates the potential for arbitrary and
discriminatory arrests.” See id. at 590.
The district court determined I.C. § 49-638(1) did not vest complete discretion in law
enforcement officers, because the Idaho Driver’s Education Manual recommended a minimum
three-second following distance, and Corporal Cottrell had been trained that the average person
has a reaction time of one to one-and-one-half seconds, during which a person going 65 mph
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could travel between 95 and 140 feet. (See R., p.74.) However, the above cannot serve as
guidelines for purposes of the vagueness doctrine, because they do not appear in the statute itself.
The United States Supreme Court held in Kolender this aspect of the vagueness doctrine
constitutes “the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law
enforcement.” See Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358 (emphasis added). The legislature is responsible
for setting the standards of criminal law, not police officers, prosecutors, or juries. See Smith,
415 U.S. at 575. Thus, recommendations from the driver’s manual, or factoids from police
training, cannot serve as guidelines because they were not set by the Idaho Legislature as part of
Section 49-638(1).
The situation would perhaps be different if the Idaho Legislature saw fit to include in
I.C. § 49-638 the three-second following distance recommendation highlighted by the district
court here. In State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195 (1998), the Idaho Supreme Court held, “[i]t is the list
of examples in the Boise City disorderly conduct ordinance that distinguishes it from the
Pocatello ordinance which the Court in Bitt found to be vague, generalized and giving no
guidelines for the exercise of discretion.” Cobb, 132 Idaho at 199. The disorderly conduct at
issue in Cobb outlined “a generalized description of conduct deemed to be disorderly,” but also
included a non-exclusive list of specific violations. See id. at 197-99. However, unlike the
ordinance in Cobb, Section 49-638(1) does not contain a list of examples of prohibited conduct
that would form a “core of circumstances” to “direct[] the exercise of discretion of the police.”
See id. at 199. Further, the three-second following distance recommendation was not included in
Section 49-638(1) as an example of “reasonable and prudent” following.
Idaho Code § 49-638(1) vests complete discretion in the hands of the police officer to
determine whether a person followed more closely than is reasonable and prudent. Thus, Section
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49-638 failed to provide sufficient guidelines, such that the police had unbridled discretion in
determining whether to arrest Mr. Harper.

See Bitt, 118 Idaho at 590.

The statute is

unconstitutionally vague as applied to Mr. Harper’s conduct.
Because I.C. § 49-638(1), the statute used to justify Mr. Harper’s traffic stop, is
unconstitutionally vague as applied to his conduct, there was no reasonable and articulable
suspicion that his car was being driven contrary to traffic laws. See Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417;
Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663. The traffic stop therefore violated Mr. Harper’s constitutional right to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. See Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417. The district court
erred when it denied Mr. Harper’s motion to suppress. The district court should have suppressed
the statements and evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop. See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at
487-88; Mapp, 367 U.S. at 643.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. Harper respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district
court’s order of judgment and commitment, reverse the order denying his motion to suppress,
and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 8th day of August, 2017.

__________/s/_______________
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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